// privacy

Privacy Policy

last updated 12 November 2026

This policy covers the CryptYak website (cryptyak.com and its onion address) and the CryptYak Helper desktop app for Windows, macOS and Linux. CryptYak is run by one person, Damon (CA3LE). When it says "I" or "me", that's who it means.

The short version

No accounts. I never ask for your name, email, phone number or anything else about you.
No analytics, no ads, no trackers, no third-party scripts.
Clipvault items are encrypted on your device before they reach me. Chat, calls and screens go straight between devices, encrypted end to end, and I keep none of it.
I never sell or share what little I can see.

What I never collect

The contents of your Clipvault items, file names, chat messages, files sent in chat, calls, shared screens, or anything typed or clicked during remote help. Clipvault items are stored only encrypted, and the rest never passes through me unencrypted. I also don't collect contact details, location, contacts, advertising identifiers or device identifiers. One honest limit: a tape's short code is also its key, so someone in control of my running server could note a code as a tape is opened and read that tape while it lives. Sealed links don't have that limit.

What reaches my server, and how long it stays

Encrypted Clipvault items: Stored scrambled, with their sizes and times. A tape and everything on it is deleted a day after it was last used, and never lives longer than three days. Anyone with the code can delete items sooner.
Sealed links: The scrambled item and how many opens are left. The key sits in the part of the link my server never receives. Gone when its opens or its time run out, whichever comes first.
Codes: My server sees a Clipvault code when a device opens a tape, and a chat code when someone joins a room. It doesn't store either in readable form, and codes are blanked out of the web server logs.
Chat and calls: My server introduces two browsers so they can connect, then steps aside. When two networks can't reach each other, my relay passes the encrypted traffic along and can't read it. Its system log notes each relayed session (the two network addresses, the times and how much passed through) until the log rolls over. What was said, shown or sent is never kept. If my relay details can't be fetched, your browser asks Google's public connection server for its own network address instead, the standard lookup most video calls make.
Your network address: Used to stop people guessing codes and to keep anyone from filling the server. Guess counters hold the address itself for about a day, longer while a lockout lasts. Daily usage totals (how many tapes, items and bytes, plus wrong codes, failed chat joins and edits) are kept against a keyed, one-way fingerprint of the address rather than the address, for about thirteen months, so I can spot abuse. Each tape also keeps that fingerprint for the device that made it and the devices that opened it, until the tape is deleted, so no one address can open or fill too many. If an address keeps abusing the service I can block its fingerprint by hand, with a short note why, until I lift it. My own admin actions are logged for a year.
Web server logs: Like nearly every website, the server notes each request's address, time, page (with codes blanked), result and browser name. These logs are for keeping the site running and are rotated away within a few weeks.
Site totals: Counts per day across everyone, such as how many tapes were made and how much was stored. They say nothing about any one person.

What stays on your device

The website keeps a few things in your own browser, never sent to me: pieces of an upload so it can resume, a cache of encrypted pieces you already downloaded, a token that lets you delete a tape or link you made, a random nickname for this device on your tapes, whether you dismissed the home screen tip, whether you stirred, and your settings (reader, format detection, wiping photo details, call devices). If you pick a colour theme, a small cookie remembers it. There are no tracking cookies. Clearing your browser's site data removes all of it.

CryptYak Helper app

The Helper lets someone you trust see your screen, and when you allow it, use your mouse and keyboard, from your CryptYak chat. It does nothing until you open it from your own chat and agree.

Permissions. It needs screen capture to share your screen and input control so the person helping can click and type once you press Let them click. On Linux your desktop asks which screen to share each time, and the first time whether to allow remote control.
Where your screen goes. Straight to the browser of the person helping you, encrypted with keys made fresh for that one session. It may pass through my relay, still encrypted. It is never recorded or saved, by the app or by me.
What it talks to. cryptyak.com, to join your chat and fetch relay details, and the one browser it is connected to. If the relay details can't be fetched, it asks Google's public connection server for its own network address, the standard lookup most video calls make; nothing else is sent. It sends no usage data, crash reports or telemetry and shows no ads.
What it keeps on your computer. A note that you have seen the safety warning and, on Linux, the desktop's permission token so you aren't asked to allow remote control every time. No screen images, no history. Uninstalling removes both on Windows. On a Mac or Linux the app's settings folder stays behind after you remove the app: delete the CryptYak Helper folder in your Library's Application Support (Mac) or in the hidden config folder in your home (Linux).

If you install it from the Microsoft Store or another app store, that store handles downloads and updates under its own privacy policy.

Who else is involved

The site runs on a server I rent, and its web traffic passes through Cloudflare, a network that delivers websites and shields them from attacks. To do that it opens the traffic at its edge, so it sees what my server sees: addresses, the pages you visit, and a Clipvault code when a tape is opened. It never sees inside your items, which are encrypted before upload, and chat, calls and screens don't pass through it. The onion address doesn't use Cloudflare. The only other outside service is the public connection server mentioned above, used when mine can't answer. No one else gets anything from me.

Requests from authorities

I can only hand over what I have, and that is what's listed above. Stored items are encrypted and I don't keep their codes, and messages, calls and screens never reach me unencrypted. The short-code limit above still applies to a tape while it is being opened.

Children

CryptYak doesn't ask anyone, of any age, for personal information, and has no accounts or profiles to collect it into.

Your choices

Since nothing is tied to a name or account, there is no profile of you to look up, export or delete. You can delete your own items and tapes at any time, or simply let them expire. If you have a question or a request, get in touch below.

Changes

If this policy changes, the new version goes here with a new date at the top. I won't start collecting more without saying so on this page first.

Contact

Contact CA3LE. More about how CryptYak protects you is in How It Works.

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